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THE MARITAL DEDUCTION DILEMMA OF
THE RENOUNCING SPOUSE
INTRODUCTION

For the purposes of calculating the federal estate tax imposed by section 2001 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the
taxable estate is determined in part by deducting from the gross
estate an amount equal to the value of any interests in the gross
estate that have passed to the surviving spouse.' This deduction
is the marital deduction. The maximum amount of this marital
deduction permitted under section 2056(c) is fifty percent of the
value of the adjusted gross estate. The interest passing to the
surviving spouse may be a bequest, devise, dower interest or
statutory forced share. 2 While the forced share of the surviving
renouncing spouse may be eligible for the marital deduction, 8
state law will determine whether the renunciation share is
reduced by federal or state succession, legacy or inheritance
taxes. 4 A distinct problem arises if the renunciation share is
burdened with federal estate and state succession taxes. If the
renunciation share is reduced by the federal estate tax, and if
the federal estate tax is calculated with reference to that reduced
share, a circuitotis computation with interrelated data is neces5
sary in order to calculate the renunciation share.
The Illinois Legislature has enacted a new probate code
which went into effect on January 1, 1976.6 Section 2-8 of the
new code provides that the renouncing spouse is entitled to a
certain fraction of the testator's estate after the payment of
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(a).

2. Id., § 2056(e) (1), (2), (3).
3. Id., § 2056(e) (3).
4. See Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942). The Court in Riggs
upheld the constitutionality of the New York Apportionment Act (N.Y.
DECEDENT ESTATE LAW, ch. 709, § 124, Laws of 1930). In addition the
Court noted that the determination of the final impact of the federal estate tax was to be predicated on state law. 317 U.S. at 97-98.
5. To calculate the renunciation share if that interest is burdened
by the federal estate tax, the decedent's gross estate is first reduced by
funeral expenses, expenses of administration and claims against the estate, including the federal estate tax. A percentage of this remainder
is the renunciation share. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-8 (1975).
The value of the federal estate tax used in this computation is determined by subtracting from the decedent's gross estate certain deductions including the marital deduction. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
In the case of a surviving renouncing spouse, the renunciation share may
well be the entire marital deduction. The computation is therefore circuitous involving interrelated data.
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 1-1 et seq. (1975).
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all just claims. 7 Section 18-10 of the new code provides that
the federal estate tax is a claim against the testator's estate.8
In addition to Illinois, eighteen states have statutes that define
the renunciation share as a portion of the gross estate reduced
by claims including the federal estate tax. 9 Fourteen states have
statutes that do not define the renunciation share as a portion
of the gross estate reduced by claims against the estate such as
the federal estate tax. 10
7. Id., § 2-8 (1975).
8. Id., § 18-10 (1975). See also Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson, 344
Ill. App. 508, 101 N.E.2d 604 (1951).
9. The following states define the renunciation share either by statute or by case law modifying a statute as a portion of the decedent's
gross estate less claims against the estate, including the federal estate
tax: Alaska (ALAS. STAT. §§ 13.11.070, 13.11.075 (1973) and ALAS. STAT.
§ 13.16.470 (Supp. 1975)); Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. tit. 15-12-805(d)
(1973) and COLO. REV. STAT. tit. 15-11-201, tit. 15-11-202 (Supp. 1975));
Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 732.207, 733.707 (Supp. 1975)); Hawaii (HAWAi REV. STAT. § 533-14 (1968) and HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 533-1, 533-16
(Supp. 1973) and In re Glover, 45 Hawaii 569, 371 P.2d 361 (1962)); Illinois (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2- 8(1975) and Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson.
344 Ill. App. 508, 101 N.E.2d 601 (1951)); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §
59-502 (1964) and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2233 (Supp. 1975)); Kentucky
(Ky. REV. STAT. § 392.020 (1970) and KY. REV. STAT. § 392.080 (Supp.
1974) and see Ruh's Executors v. Ruh, 270 Ky. 792, 110 S.W.2d 1097
(1937)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 851, 1001 (1964) and
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 852, 1057 (Supp. 1975) and Old Colony
Trust Co. v. McGowan, 156 Me. 138, 163 A.2d 538 (1960)); Mississippi
(Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 91-5-25, 91-5-29 (Supp. 1975) and Banks v. Junk,
264 So. 2d 387, 392 (Miss. 1972) and Gordon v. James, 26 Miss. 719, 39
So. 18 (1905)); Montana (REV: CODE OF MONT. tit. 91-A-2-201, 91-A-2-202,
91-A-3-805 (1975)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 557:22
(1974) and N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:10 (Supp. 1974) ); North Carolina
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-2(5) (1965) and N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-1, 30-3,
28A-22-1, 28A-19-6 (Supp. 1975) but in the event there are no lineal descendants see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3 (Supp. 1975) and First Union Nat'l
Bank v. Melvin, 259 N.C. 255, 130 S.E.2d 387 (1963)); North Dakota (N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 30.1-05-01, 30.1-05-02, 30.1-19-05 (Supp. 1975));
Ohio (OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2107.39 and Comment, 2117.25 (1968) and
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Supp. 1974)); Oregon (ORE. REV. STAT.
tit. 12, §§ 114.105, 114.125, 115.125 (1973)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§
75-2-201, 75-2-202, 75-3-805 (Supp. 1975) effective July 1, 1977); Vermont
(VER. STAT. ANN., tit. 14, §§ 401, 1260 (1974)); Virginia (CODE OF VA.
§§ 64.1-16, 64.1-11, 64.1-157 (1973)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE §§ 423-1, 42-2-1 (1974) and W. VA. CODE § 44-2-21 (Supp. 1975)).
10. The following states define the renunciation share either by statute or by case law modifying a statute as a portion of the decedent's
gross estate less certain claims exclusive of the federal estate tax: Alabama (CODE OF ALA. tit. 61, § 18 (1973)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12, §§ 901, 902 (1975)); Indiana (IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-1-3-1 (1974)
and Seymour Nat'l Bank v. Heideman, 133 Ind. App. 104, 178 N.E.2d 771
(1961)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.238 (1975)); Maryland (ANN.
CODE OF MD., Estates & Trusts, §§ 3-203, 3-102(b), (f), 11-109 (1974));
Massachusetts (ANN. LAWS OF MASS. ch. 191, § 15 (1974)); Missouri
(VERNON'S ANN. MO. STAT. § 474.160 (1975) and In re Estate of Hough,
457 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. 1970) and Hammond v. Wheeler, 347 S.W.2d 884
(Mo. 1961)); Nebraska (REV. STAT. OF NEB. § 30-103.01 (1975)); New
York (N.Y. DECED. ESTATE LAW § 5-1.1 (1965)); Pennsylvania (PURDON'S
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2508 (1975)); Rhode Island (GEN. LAWS OF R.I.
§§ 33-6-22, 33-4-1 (1975)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 31-606, 31607 (Supp. 1975)); Wisconsin (WIs. STAT. ANN. § 861.05 (1971)); and
Wyoming (WYo. STAT. tit. 2, § 2-47 (Supp. 1975)).
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This comment will explore the policy of congressional and
state legislation, and case law, regarding the propriety of burdening the renunciation share with the federal estate tax, and provide the practitioner with a reliable method of calculating the
renunciation share when that interest is reduced by the federal
estate tax.
THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX AND THE RENUNcIATION SHARE

Three years after the adoption of the federal estate tax in
1916, the United States Attorney General ruled that the executor
of a decedent domiciled in a community property state need only
include one-half of the community property in the gross estate
for federal estate tax purposes.1 1 This ruling was predicated
on the notion that each spouse in a community property state
was regarded as owning one-half of the property throughout the
marriage. 12 In 1948 Congress passed the split income tax proSee also 67 A.L.R.3d 199 (1975) for an excellent treatment of
case law interpreting the renunciation provisions of several states.
Apportionment statutes or decisions may provide that federal estate
taxes are not to be apportioned against the renunciation share. See, e.g.,
COLO. Rv. STAT. 15-12-805(d) (1973) and COLO. REv. STAT. 15-11-201,
15-11-202 (Supp. 1975). Such statutes apportioning the federal estate tax
among the interests in the decedent's gross estate other than the marital
deduction should be read in conjunction with the definitional statutes
providing for the calculation of the renunciation share. See note 65 infra.
The remaining twelve states are either community property states
and have no provision for a statutory forced share because of the automatic statutory community property share, or they are common law
states that have no provision for a statutory forced share: Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas and Washington.
The District of Columbia subjects the renunciation share to the fed-

eral estate tax: D.C.

CODE

ANN. § 19-113 (1975) and Del Mar v. U.S.,

390 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
11. T.D. 2450, 19 TREAS. DEC. 38 (1917).
12. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). Seaborn and his wife
were residents of the state of Washington. They accumulated real estate,
stocks, bonds and other personal property. The parties' income was
comprised of the husband's salary, interest on bank deposits and bonds,

dividends, and profits from sales of real and personal property. The
Commissioner determined that all of the income should have been reported in the husband's income tax return for the year 1927. The taxpayer reported only one-half of the income, while his wife reported the
other one-half. The U.S. Supreme Court, in construing sections 210(a)
and 211(a) of the Revenue Act of 1926, held that under the statutes of
Washington, a husband and wife were entitled to file separate income
tax returns and each could therefore treat one-half of the community income as his or her respective income.
With the ruling of the Attorney General and the Seaborn decision,
several states began to adopt the community property system despite the
lack of historical connection with Spanish law. The states adopting community property laws were Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon and
Pennsylvania. These statutes were repealed, however, when the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled in Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944)
that optional systems of community property law, not dictated by state
policy as an incident of matrimony, could not bring the husband or wife
within the reach of Seaborn. The Court noted that the existence of such
an option would result in a marital property arrangement similar to that
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vision, the split gift provision, and the estate and gift tax marital deduction provision.1 3 These provisions were designed to end
differences between community property states and other states
with respect to the taxation of income, gifts and estates, regardless of historical property notions and geographical happenstance.
A portion of the Revenue Act of 1948 relating to estate
taxation permits a deduction from the gross estate called the
marital deduction. The marital deduction is an amount equal to
the value of all interests included in the gross estate of the deceattempted in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) wherein the taxpayer
attempted to assign one-half of his future income to his spouse by contract so as to lessen his federal income tax liability. 323 U.S. at 46. The
Court in Harmon distinguished Seaborn by noting that in Seaborn "the
court was not dealing with a consensual community but one made an
incident of marriage by the inveterate policy of the State." 323 U.S.
at 46. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented, in an opinion joined by Mr. Justice

Black, arguing that while he does not intend to defend the Seaborn result, he feels that the Court should not permit the income-splitting arrangement authorized by Seaborn to become a vested interest of only

a few states. 323 U.S. at 56.
The concern voiced by Douglas and Black was heeded by Congress
four years later when it enacted the split income tax provision, the split
gift provision, and the estate and gift tax marital deduction provision.
Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, §§ 301 et seq., 62 Stat. 110, 114.
13. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, §§ 301 et seq., 62 Stat. 110, 114. Criticism of the holding in Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) included the
realization by the critics that the husband's control over both halves of
the community property during coverture was usually so substantial so
as to make it more appropriate to include the entire property in his gross
estate if he were the first to die. See Eisenstein, Estate Taxes and the
Higher Learning of the Supreme Court, 3 TAX L. REV. 395, 538-40 (1948).
In 1942 Congress first moved to equalize the estate tax consequences of

common law and community property states on the grounds that the legal and economic differences between the two systems did not warrant

the substantial difference in their federal tax burdens. See Revenue Act

of 1942, ch. 619, § 402(b), 56 Stat. 798, 942.

The Revenue Act of 1942 relating to the estate and gift tax consequences was upheld by the Supreme Court under constitutional attack
in Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945). See also Francis v. Comm'r,
8 T.C. 822 (1947) and Beavers v. Comm'r, 165 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1947).

The Revenue Act of 1942, however, did not cover the income tax advan-

tages of community property states. As such, the community property
concept began to spread. See note 12 supra.

Congress then acted in 1948 to halt this spread of community prop-

erty due to the remaining income tax advantages in the 1942 Act by repealing the 1942 Act and enacting in its place the Revenue Act of 1948.

The 1948 Act equalized the estate, gift and income tax consequences of

both community property and common law states.
The thrust of the 1948 Act was actually the converse of the 1942 Act.
The 1942 Act required the entire amount of the community property to
be included in the gross estate of the first spouse to die less that amount
proven to have been received through the sole efforts of the surviving
spouse. See Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 402(b), 56 Stat. 798, 942.
As such, the 1942 Act did not permit the common law states, to which
the Act was not addressed, to split in half the estate taxation of the first
spouse to die; the 1942 Act instead altered the established community
property theories developed over hundreds of years. While the constitutionality of the 1942 Act was upheld, the 1942 Act was a less than satisfactory solution. See S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1948-1 C.B. 285, 304-05 for a discussion of the arguments of the Senate
Committee on Finance in favor of adopting the opposite approach of the
1942 Act.
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dent and his spouse which pass to the surviving spouse, but not
in excess of one-half of the adjusted gross estate of the decedent
spouse.14 The statutory forced share is an interest that is considered as passing from the decedent to the surviving spouse.1 5
If this interest qualifies for the marital deduction, 16 then that
amount is subtracted from the decedent's gross estate along with
all other permissible deductions 17 The balance is termed the
taxable estate, 18 and the appropriate tax rate is then applied to
this figure to arrive at the federal estate tax due.1 9
The uniform taxation of income, gifts, and estates as between

community property and common law jurisdictions was a motive
behind the enactment by Congress of both the 1942 and 1948
Revenue Acts. 20 The result of this equalization is that the tax-

able estates of persons residing in common law states should
approximate the taxable estates of persons residing in community property states. Theoretically, there should be a uniform
treatment of all persons required to file estate tax returns. However, this standardization in estate tax treatment is to a large
extent frustrated by state laws which prescribe that the marital
deduction share be reduced by federal or state succession taxes.
Election statutes that require the renunciation or elective share
to be computed after the payment of debts and claims against
the estate prevent this standardization of estate taxation.
This frustration of the purpose of section 2056 has been
recognized, and some courts have refused to permit the renuncia14. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(a), (c). The adjusted gross estate
is determined by subtracting from the gross estate the deductions of sections 2053 and 2054, which are all expenses, taxes, debts and losses of
the decedent. Id., § 2056(c) (2). Property that has passed or that
passes to the surviving spouse includes that property that is includible
in the decedent's gross estate, including insurance benefits, gifts in contemplation of death, and joint tenancy property. See Treas. Reg. 20.2056
(e)-l.
15. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056 (e) (3).
16. To qualify for the marital deduction, (1) the property must have
been included in the decedent's gross estate, (2) the property must have
"passed" by will, operation of law or otherwise to the surviving spouse
and (3) the interest must not be a terminable interest, i.e., the interest
in the property may not terminate before the death of the surviving
spouse andwill therefore not be excluded from the gross estate of the
surviving spouse. Id., § 2056.
17. Id., § 2051.
18. Id.
19. Id., § 2101.
20. See United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 122 (1963). The Court
in Stapf decided the question of to what extent a marital deduction is
permissible in a community property state if the property devised to the
surviving spouse exceeds the value the testator required the surviving
spouse to relinquish in order to take under the will. In Stapf Justice
Goldberg noted that "[t]he 1948 tax amendments were intended to
equalize the effect of the estate taxes in community property and common-law jurisdictions." Id. at 128. He continued to note that the primary thrust of the Revenue Act of 1948 is to extend to taxpayers in common-law states the advantage of "estate-splitting" otherwise available
exclusively in community property jurisdictions. Id,
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tion share to be reduced by such taxes. 21 Other courts have
approached the problem differently, believing that the marital
deduction should not be burdened by the federal estate tax since
it is not included in the taxable estate. 22 These courts theorize
that inasmuch as Congress intended the marital deduction to be
a tax-exempt interest, subsequent taxation of that interest would
violate the intent of Congress.
Notwithstanding the inherent frustration of section 2056 and
the non-contributory nature of the marital deduction to the taxable estate, it is also unfair to impose estate tax liability on an
interest that did not contribute to that liability.23 Because the
marital deduction is subtracted from the gross estate in arriving
at the taxable estate, the marital deduction decreases estate tax
liability and does not increase it. It does not seem proper to
require that interest, in the form of a forced share, to bear a
proportionate burden of the federal estate tax.2 4
Although not directly related to a frustration of the purpose
of section 2056, perhaps the most persuasive argument against
burdening the renunciation share with federal estate taxes is
found in the structure of the forced share statutes. The dower,
curtesy and forced share statutes are designed to protect the sur21. Many jurisdictions have recognized such a frustration of congressional intent and have refused to permit the depletion of the marital deduction. In Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Huber, 240 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1951), the court said that the renunciation share of the surviving
spouse should not be burdened with federal estate tax liability and held
that it was to pass to the surviving spouse undiminished by succession
taxes. The court noted that the apparent purpose behind the enactment
of the Revenue Act of 1948 was to equalize community property and noncommunity property estate taxation. See also In re Fuchs' Estate, 60
So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1952). The Florida legislature in 1949 enacted an apportionment statute that exempted the marital deduction from contribution
to the federal estate tax. The court in Fuchs' noted that the apportionment act was passed one year after the Revenue Act of 1948. The court
then held that the marital deduction and other deductions and exemptions should not bear the burden of the federal estate tax because the
1949 Apportionment Act must be read in conjunction with the Revenue
Act of 1948.
22. See, e.g., In re Fuchs' Estate, 60 So. 2d 536, 538 (Fla. 1952).
23. See Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Huber, 240 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1951); see also In re Fuchs' Estate, 60 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1952).
The court in Fuchs' noted that the legislature intended to exempt from
the impact of the estate tax those assets of the decedent's estate not includible in the taxable estate. Id. at 537.
24. See Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Huber, 240 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1951) (the court said that because the surviving spouse's share
would not add to the amount of the tax, it should not therefore be burdened with it); Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1955) (the court
said that it would be unfair and unjust to require the renunciation share
to bear any portion of the estate tax because the estate receives the benefit of the deduction of the interest passing from the gross estate); Hammond v. Wheeler, 347 S.W.2d 884 (Mo. 1961). The surviving spouse in
Hammond entered into a contract with the heirs of the deceased to distribute a share of her stock in kind and then to sell the balance. The
court felt that it would be unfair and unjust to require the surviving
poOuse to pay a portion of the federal estate tax on an interest which
es not cause or contribute to any part of the tax. Id. at 893.
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viving spouse. The traditional notion of dower was that of giving the wife a guaranteed share of her husband's realty in the
event that he either transferred the property to another or failed
to provide properly for the wife after his death. The forced
share statutes presumably are similarly designed. If that guaranteed interest is later subject to diminution by another state
statute authorizing the deduction of death taxes therefrom, the
purpose of the forced share statute is partially frustrated.
The distinguishing characteristic of the view that it is
improper to burden the renunciation share with federal estate
taxes is that, in theory, section 2056 and forced share statutes
should be read in conjunction with one another. This may not
necessarily be true. Some courts have said that the federal
25
estate tax is an excise tax on the transfer of the entire estate.
The purpose of the federal estate tax is not to tax specific legacies
and bequests per se, but rather to tax the estate as an entity
upon the death of the decedent.28 The argument proceeds that
the federal estate tax serves a separate and distinct function from
any state statutes relative to a surviving spouse. While it provides for taxation of the decedent's estate, the federal estate tax
does not exempt the renunciation share from taxation.
The independence of section 2056 from a forced share statute
is also evident from a literal reading of the section. Section 2056
does not specifically exempt the surviving spouse's share from
estate taxation. 27 In the absence of such an exemption, it is
argued that section 2056 expressly negatives any intent by Congress to exempt the share of the renouncing spouse from estate
tax liability. 28
Indeed, a close reading of section 2056 may
25. See Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Macomber, 32 Wash. 2d 696, 203
P.2d 1078 (1949). In Macomber the court said that the estate tax is a
tax upon the entire estate and not upon any particular devise, bequest
or distributive share. Id. at 700, 203 P.2d at 1081'.
26. See Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Macomber, 32 Wash. 2d 696, 203
P.2d 1078 (1949) wherein the court said:
The estate tax is upon the entire estate, payable as an expense of
administration, and not upon the particular devise, bequest or distributive share of the individual beneficiary.
Id. at 700, 203 P.2d at 1081.
27. Section 2056 is limited to a description of the qualifying interests
that are deemed to be interests that pass to the surviving spouse for purposes of federal estate taxation. Section 2056 does not provide that those
interests which qualify for the marital deduction are also to be exempt
from ultimately contributing to the final death tax.
28. See Will of Uihlein, 264 Wis. 362, 371, 59 N.W.2d 641, 645 (1953).
The Uihlein court noted that section 2056(b) (4) (A) (formerly section
812(e) (1) (E) (i) when Uihlein was decided) provides that for purposes
of valuing the marital deduction, -there must be taken into account the
effect the federal estate tax has on the net value given to the surviving
spouse. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (4) (A). The Uihlein court
uses this language to reach the conclusion that Congress intended that
the surviving spouse's interest bear some burden of the federal estate tax
liability. 264 Wis. at 378, 59 N.W.2d at 649.
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warrant such a conclusion. 29

Regardless of the intent of Congress in promulgating the
marital deduction provisions, some courts have argued that such
intent is irrelevant to the ultimate calculation of the surviving
spouse's interest.30 Because the Revenue Act of 1916 creating
the federal estate tax did not direct who was to bear the burden of the federal estate tax, Congress intended to leave that
determination to each state.8 1 This contention may have merit
because of its simplistic approach to the problem, but such a disposition of the issue may be unwise. Although Congress was
silent with respect to the ultimate burden of the tax, that silence
is not conclusive as to the issue of what interests may be used
to satisfy the liability for payment of the tax. Each court must
go further and reach a logical solution regarding the propriety
of burdening the renunciation share. Taking the dicta in Riggs
v. Del Drago32 as a premise that each state may determine who
is to bear the burden of the tax, the conclusion, that the intent
of Congress in adopting the marital deduction is irrelevant to
the calculation of the federal estate tax, is not inexorable. Such
congressional intent may be crucial to a proper resolution of this
marital deduction dilemma.
POSSIBLE CONSTRUcTIONS OF THE ILLINOIS
RENUNCIATION STATUTE

The Illinois Renunciation Statute provides that the surviving
spouse may elect to take either a one-half or one-third fraction
of the decedent's entire estate after the payment of all just
claims, depending on the survival of other descendants.3 3 Since
one such claim is the federal estate tax,34 the Illinois forced share
statute requires the renunciation share to bear a proportionate
29. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (4) (A).

30. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 98 (1942).
31. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 200, et seq., 39 Stat. 756, 777. The
United States Supreme Court in Riggs concluded that because the Revenue Act of 1916 did not undertake to specify who was to bear the bur-

den of the tax, Congress must have felt that the Government would not

be interested in the distribution of the estate after the estate tax was
paid. 317 U.S. at 98. See also Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson, 344 Ill. App.

508, 514, 101 N.E.2d 604, 607 (1951).

32. 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-8(a) (1975):
If a will is renounced by the testator's surviving spouse, whether or
not the will contains any provision for the benefit of the surviving
spouse, the surviving spouse is entitled to the following share of the
testator's estate after payment of all just claims: % of the entire
estate if the testator leaves a descendant or
of the entire estate
if the testator leaves no descendant.
See also Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson, 344 Ill. App. 508, 101 N.E.2d 604
(1951).
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 18-10 (1975); see also Northern Trust Co.
v. Wilson, 344 Ill. App. 508, 101 N.E.2d 604 (1951).
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burden of the federal estate tax.8 5 The Illinois approach is thus
one of the many positions taken since Riggs that apparently
frustrates both the section 2056 marital deduction, as well as the
protective purpose of the forced share statute.
The Illinois Renunciation Statute has been held by a state
appellate court to require that the surviving spouse take the
statutory fraction of the decedent's estate after a deduction of
federal estate taxes.86 This decision in Northern Trust Co. v.

Wilson3 7 was predicated on an interpretation of the 1939 Illinois
Probate Act 88 which is substantially similar to that of the
present 1975 Illinois Probate Act.3 9 Northern Trust has retained
it vitality and is a current statement of the law in Illinois.
However, there is still a question of whether Illinois courts
will ever attempt to re-interpret section 2-8 to reflect the intent
of section 2056 as well as the inherent purpose of the forced share
provision. While Illinois has not so ruled, other jurisdictions
have concluded that similar forced share statutes do not require
a deduction for federal estate taxes.4 0 Indeed, there are other
35. The renunciation share is said to bear a proportionate burden of
the federal estate tax because of the manner in which the interest is determined. For example, the Illinois statute provides that the renunciation share is one-third of the entire estate if the testator leaves a descendant after the payment of all just claims, or one-half of the entire
estate if there are descendants. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-8 (1975). The
entire estate may be construed to be all of the real and personal probate
and non-probate property of the testator. All of the testator's debts and
claims against his estate must then be deducted from this gross figure.
The statutory one-third or one-half fraction is then applied to the balance. The renunciation share is therefore reduced by a proportionate
amount of all of the testator's claims, including the federal estate tax.
36. Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson, 344 Ill. App. 508, 101 N.E.2d 604
(1951).
37. Id.
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 16 (1939).
39. Id., § 2-8 (1975).
40. Robertson v. U.S., 281 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ala. 1968). The Alabama forced share statute provided in pertinent part that if the decedent
died leaving a surviving spouse and other descendants, then the surviving spouse was to take one-half of the personal estate "after the payment
of debts and charges against the estate." ALA. CODE, tit. 16, § 10 (1940)
(Recomp. 1958). In Robertson the court held that the widow's share was
to be computed before a deduction for federal estate taxes. 281 F. Supp.
at 963. Furthermore, the Alabama legislature had provided that all estate taxes, state or federal, were to be paid out of the residue of the estate. ALA. CODE, tit. 51, § 449(1) (1940) (Recomp. 1958). Illinois has
similarly required that, absent a tax payment clause in the will, the burden of the federal estate tax falls on the residue of the probate estate.
See First Nat'l Bank v. Hart, 383 Ill. 489, 50 N.E.2d 461 (1943).
See also Hammond v. Wheeler, 347 S.W.2d 884 (Mo. 1961). The applicable Missouri statute stated in essence that the surviving spouse was
to receive one-half of the real and personal estate of the decedent belonging to the decedent at death subject to the payment of the decedent's
debts. ANN. MO. STAT. § 474.160 (1974). The Hammond court held that
the word "debts" could not include the federal estate tax because the
Missouri legislature did not intend that the federal estate tax was to be
apportioned inequitably. Rather, the court felt that the renunciation
share should not bear a proportionate burden of the federal estate tax
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possible interpretations of section 2-8 which could be employed
by the Illinois courts if the issue of Northern Trust is presented
again.
AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION

2-8

The first renunciation statute in Illinois was enacted in 1829.
That statute essentially provided that the surviving spouse was
to take one-third of the real estate for life, the widow's dower,
and one-third of the personalty forever, "which remains after
the payment of debts."'41 The language of the 1829 statute was
altered somewhat in 1872 and again in 1874. The 1874 chapter on
dower provided that the surviving spouse was entitled to "onehalf of all the real and personal estate which shall remain after
the payment of all just debts and claims against the estate of
the deceased husband or wife. '42 In the Probate Act of 1939,
the phrase "just debts and claims" was shortened to "just
claims. ' 43 In 1949 the structure of this section was again altered.
The statute then provided that the surviving spouse was "entitled
to the following share of the testator's estate after payment of
all just claims: (a) If the testator leaves a descendant, one-third
of the personal estate and one-third of each parcel of real estate.
...If the testator left no descendants, then the surviving
spouse was entitled to one-half of the personal estate and onehalf of each parcel of real estate after the payment of all just
claims.4 5 In 1971, the form of the 1949 language was retained,
but the phrase "entire estate" was substituted for the former
"personal estate and . . . each parcel of real estate. ' 46 The 1971
language was completely reenacted in the 1975 Probate Act.47
In all of these provisions for the surviving spouse, there is
a reference to a fraction of the decedent's "estate" and to the
because to do so would be to create an injustice in view of the purpose
of section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code. 347 S.W.2d 884, 889.
See also Robinson v. U.S., 518 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1975). The Robinson case in essence tested the adoption by Montana of a modified form
of the Uniform Probate Act which provided that the surviving spouse

upon renunciation was to take one-third of the "augmented estate." The
augmented estate is the estate of the decedent reduced by funeral and
administration expenses, certain allowances, and "enforceable claims."
MoNT. REV. STAT. §§ 91A-2-201, 91A-2-202 (1975). The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a prior Montana case, Marans v. Newland,
143 Mont. 388, 390 P.2d 443 (1964), did not require equitable apportionment to bequests that do not enlarge federal estate tax liability, such
as the marital deduction. The court felt that such deductions need not
be reduced by any part of the federal estate tax.
41. Act of July 1, 1829, § 40, [1829] IMI. Laws 204.
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 41, § 12 (1874).
43. Id. ch. 3, § 168 (1939).
44. Id. ch. 3, § 16 (1949).
45. Id.

46. Id., § 16 (1973).
47. Id., § 2-8 (1975).
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time for calculating that fractional interest. 48
The statutes
provide for a fraction of either the realty and the personalty
of the deceased, or for a fraction of the "entire estate" of the
deceased. Prior to the abolition of dower and curtesy in Illinois
in 1971, 4 9 the forced share provisions made reference to both
the realty and personalty of the testator.50 The reason given
for substitution of the word$ "entire estate" for the phrase "personal estate and . . . each parcel of real estate" is the abolition
51
of dower and curtesy.
However, there is also a reference in each of the prior Illinois
renunciation statutes to the time for calculating the renunciation
share. One may infer from these present and former statutes
two times for this calculation: after all debts and claims against
the estate have been paid, or before all debts and claims against
the estate have been paid. The first permissible inference corresponds to the current Illinois position regarding the time and
manner of determining the renunciation share. 52 The position
48. See notes 41-47 supra.
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 18 (1973).
50. The 1829 Act gave the surviving spouse one-third of the real estate for life and one-third of the personalty forever. Act of July 1, 1829,
§ 40, [1829] Ill. Laws 204. The 1874 Act gave the surviving spouse onehalf of "all of the real and personal estate" of the deceased. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 41, § 12 (1874).
The 1949 language gave the surviving spouse
one-third or one-half of each parcel of real estate of which the testator
died seised, the exact fraction depending on the presence or absence of
descendants.
51. Under the common-law notion of dower, a widow could elect to
take her dower interest in lieu of provisions for her in her deceased husband's will. That interest amounted to a life estate in the husband's
realty rather than a fee simple interest therein. In Braidwood v.
Charles, 327 Ill. 500, 159 N.E. 38 (1927), the Illinois Supreme Court gave
the surviving spouse the right to take a one-third interest in fee simple
of the husband's realty in lieu of the dower interest. The statute was
amended accordingly to read:
[H] e or she shall also receive as his or her absolute estate, in lieu of
ower therein, one-third of each parcel of real estate of which the intestate died seized and in which such widow or surviving husband
shall waive his or her right to dower.
H.-B. 799, 53rd Gen. Assembly, 1923 Sess. at 325.
With the abolition of the estates of dower and curtesy in Illinois in
1972, the statute was again altered to read "the entire estate" rather than
distinguishing between realty and personalty. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 16
(1973). See also JAMES, ILLINOIS PROBATE LAW & PRACTICE § 16 (Supp.
1975).
There is, however, a patent ambiguity in the phrase "the entire estate." While it may refer to a combination of the realty and personalty
of the deceased as previously mentioned, the phrase could also refer to
the deceased's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. If the phrase
is interpreted to refer to the gross estate of the testator, then a valid
conclusion from that premise is that the renunciation share should not
be first reduced by the federal estate tax prior to the calculation of that
interest. If a court was to adopt such an interpretation, then neither the
purpose of section 2056 nor the protective design of forced share statutes
generally would be frustrated.
52. Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson, 344 Ill. App. 508, 101 N.E.2d 604
(1951). The court in Northern Trust said that the federal estate tax is
to be considered an item of expense, such as debts and funeral expenses,
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announced in Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson5 3 is that the renunciation share must be calculated after the claims against the decedent's estate have been deducted from the decedent's gross
estate.54 The justification for that inference is based on the
statutory construction and implication from the phrase: "the
surviving spouse is entitled to the following share of the
testator's estate after payment of all just claims .... -"5 The
surviving spouse's share is arguably determined after the payment of the just claims against the estate. 56
While the first permissible inference to be drawn from section 2-8 is perhaps the more obvious one, the second possibility
is equally plausible and perhaps more logical. It is simply that
the language of section 2-8 and its predecessors implies that the
size of the surviving spouse's renunciation share is to be determined before any reduction in the decedent's estate. For example, the 1874 statute provided that "the surviving husband or
wife may, if he or she should so elect, have .. .one-half of all
the real and personal estate which shall remain after the payment of all just debts and claims . . . ,,57 The language "which
shall remain" may arguably refer to the survival of this onehalf interest after the payment of all just debts and claims.
In other words, the one-half interest of all real and personal
property "shall remain" after the satisfaction of claims.
Section 2-8 of the 1975 Probate Act may also be interpreted
in a similar fashion. The pertinent language of section 2-8 is
that "the surviving spouse is entitled to the following share of
the testator's estate after payment of all just claims:
3 of the
entire estate if the testator leaves a descendant or % of the
entire estate if the testator leaves no descendant."58 The inference which may be drawn from that language is that the survivand must therefore come within the classification of claims under section
202 of the Illinois Probate Act (now section 18-10). The court then concluded that the renunciation share is "subject to the 'payment of all just
claims.'" 344 Ill. App. 508, 515, 101 N.E.2d 604, 607. The court did not

expressly state that section 16 (now section 2-8) implicitly required the

calculation of the renunciation share to be made after the payment of
the claims against the estate. Such an inference, however, was clearly
one of the premises adopted by the court in reaching its conclusion.
53. 344 Ill. App. 508, 101 N.E.2d 604 (1951).

54. Id. at 514-15, 101 N.E.2d at 607.
55. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-8 (1975).
56. A similar interpretation can be made with reference to the 1872
and 1874 acts. Those acts essentially provided that the surviving spouse
was to take a one-third or one-half interest of all the realty and personalty of the decedent "which shall remain after the payment of all just
debts and claims against the estate . . . ." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 41, § 12
(1874). One could clearly infer that the realty and personalty which
remains after the payment of the decedent's claims is the size of the estate to which the surviving spouse's fraction is applied.
57. ILL. R-v. STAT. ch. 41, § 12 (1874).
58. Id. ch. 3, § 2-8 (1975).
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ing spouse is entitled to the one-third or one-half interest of the
entire estate at all times, regardless of the necessary payments
or expenses by the decedent's estate.
. Therefore, one resolution to the marital deduction
dilemma
in Illinois is to interpret section 2-8 to require the calculation
of the renunciation share before the payment of any claims of
the estate. Another solution is to apportion the federal estate
tax between those interests contributing to the tax burden.
APPORTIONMENT OF FEDERAL ESTATE

TAxEs 59

The first federal estate tax enacted in 1916 required the
executor of the deceased's estate to pay the federal estate tax. 60
The New York State Legislature in 1930 enacted an apportionment statute requiring all persons entitled to property included
in the decedent's gross estate to pay a proportionate share of
the federal death taxes."' The New York statute was adopted
in response to a series of state court decisions holding that the
residue of the decedent's estate should bear the burden of the
federal estate tax.6 2 In Riggs v. Del Drago 6s the United States
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the New York
apportionment statute and noted that the determination of the
final impact of the federal estate tax was to be predicated solely
on state law.6 4 Some state legislatures followed the New York
position and promulgated apportionment statutes providing for
the calculation of the surviving spouse's renunciation share.
Usually the statutes express the intention of the legislature to
exonerate the forced share from contribution, but where that
intention is not expressed, it may be implied from the statute's
65
silence.
Some courts have followed the suggestion of the Supreme
Court in Riggs and have developed theories on apportionment
in the absence of legislative enactments. 66 The essence of this
approach is to impose federal estate tax liability on all interests
. 59. See Kahn, The Federal Estate Tax Burden Borne by a Dissenting
Widow, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1499 (1966) for an excellent treatment of apportioning federal estate taxes against the renunciation share.
60. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 207, 39 Stat. 779.
61. N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW, ch. 709, § 124, Laws of 1930.

62. See Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N.Y. 488, 144 N.E.
769 (1924) and YMCA v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. 114 (1922),
aff'd 264 U.S. 47 (1924).
63. 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
64. Id. at 97-98.
65. See In re Rosenfeld's Estate, 376 Pa. 42, 101 A.2d 684 (1954). But
see Moorman v. Moorman, 340 Mich. 636, 66 N.W.2d 248 (1954).
See Estate Tax Reporter,
120,026 (Prentice-Hall) at 120,033 for a
consolidation of state apportionment statutes and court decisions relating
to the apportionment of federal estate taxes.
66. Ramsey v. Nordloh 143 Colo. 526, 354 P.2d 513 (1960); Myers v.
Sinkler, 235 S.C. 162, 110 S.E.2d 241 (1959).
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passing from the decedent's taxable estate. Only those interests
contributing to the taxable estate are required to satisfy the
estate tax liability because those are the only interests that benefit from the payment of the federal estate tax.
The apportionment of liability among the interests in the
taxable estate is analogous to the notion of liens on property.
Persons interested in removing liens and other burdens on property ought to take coextensive obligations in the removal of those
encumbrances. Once the property is free from all restraints,
then all persons interested therein may take their respective
shares. The federal estate tax imposes a lien for unpaid taxes
on all assets comprising the decedent's gross estate.6 7 Every taker
of an interest includible in the decedent's gross estate is therefore
personally liable for the satisfaction of his or her lien.68 All
persons taking from the decedent's gross estate benefit from the
removal of the federal estate tax lien to the extent of his property interest and proportionate share of the federal estate tax.
Apportioning the burden of paying the death tax between those
interests is argued to be a more equitable method of satisfying
federal estate tax liability than requiring the residuary estate
to pay the entire estate tax. 9 Under this interpretation, however, the surviving spouse should contribute to relieve the lien
imposed on the marital deduction.
The patent fairness of the apportionment approach appears
to be perhaps the most equitable solution. It is certainly more
just than the present Illinois posture of burdening the renunciation share solely because of the strict statutory construction of
section 2-8. Yet, there are some courts that have reached precisely the opposite conclusion. These courts have adopted the
doctrine of equitable apportionment, but have concurrently
rejected the proposition that the renunciation share should not
70
be burdened with federal estate taxes.
While the propriety of burdening the renunciation share
with estate taxes continues to be an area of controversy, the
practitioner must face the reality of calculating that interest,
whether or not it is reduced by taxes. The critical problem of
determining a renunciation share reduced by federal estate taxes
involves computations with interrelated data.
67. I T.REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6324(a) (2).
68. Id.
69. Jones v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. 1964); Seymour Nat'l Bank
v. Heideman, 133 Ind. App. 104, 178 N.E.2d 771 (1962).
70. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. McGowan, 156 Me. 138, 163 A.2d 538
(1960); Bragdon v. Worthly, 153 A.2d 627 (Me. 1959); Campbell v. Lloyd,
162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695 (1954).
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CALCULATION OF THE RENUNCIATION SHAE

The interrelationship of the federal estate tax and the
renunciation share must be dealt with in order to calculate the
forced share in states such as Illinois. The renunciation share
is determined by subtracting debts, expenses of administration
and claims including the federal estate tax 71 from the gross
estate.72 The remainder is then multiplied by a statutory fraction, 73 and the result is the final renunciation share.
In arriving at the federal estate tax, the marital deduction
must first be deducted from the gross estate along with other
deductions such as the statutory exemption. 74 The federal
estate tax rate is then applied to this remainder, or taxable
estate.7 5 In the case of a renouncing spouse, the marital deduction may well be the value of the renunciation share.7 8 Since
the value of the renunciation share is dependent on the value
of the federal estate tax, and due to the fact that the federal
estate tax is dependent on the renunciation share, a circuitous
computation arises.
There are three methods of arriving at the renunciation
share when that interest is dependent on the federal estate tax.
The first method employs trial figures for the value of the marital deduction from which the federal estate tax is determined.
The value of this trial tax is then repeatedly subtracted from
the previous trial marital deduction until the taxable estate,
77
marital deduction and trial tax coincide.
A second method of calculating the forced share utilizes a
series of linear equations, all of which are expressed in terms
of the same unknown. Once the federal estate tax and the state
death tax are expressed in terms of this unknown, the two equations can be combined to solve for the unknown. The marital
deduction can then be determined from the value of the federal
estate tax. The reverse process can then be used as a proof that
the value for the federal estate tax was correct. This is accomplished by solving for the federal estate tax using the value of
the marital deduction. 8
The third method of calculating the renunciation interest
involves the use of one algebraic equation. This method is
preferable because of the simplicity of inserting known values
71.

ILL. REv. STAT.

72. Id., § 18-10.
73. Id., § 2-8.

74.
75.
76.
77.
706 at
78.

ch. 3, § 2-8 (1975).

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2051.
Id., § 2001.
Id., § 2056(e) (3).
See Supplemental Instructions for Internal Revenue Service Form
7 (Revised February 1974).
See Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Reports, 2090 (Prentice-Hall) at 3456.
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into one equation to solve for one unknown. The unknown in
this equation is the combination of federal and state death
taxes. Once this figure is determined, the renunciation share is
readily calculated.
The formula for calculating a renunciation share dependent
on federal and state death taxes is:
[(D-E)f, +
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The federal and state death tax rates must be estimated to
use this expression. This is relatively simple, however, inasmuch
as the tax brackets used in the computation of the net estate
tax are quite large. Once these tax rates are estimated, every
term in the equation is a known value, except "T."
Assume the decedent's gross estate equals $1,000,000 and that
the debts and expenses of administration total $100,000. The
decedent dies leaving a wife and two children, and subsequently
the wife is not certain whether it is in her best interests to take
the share provided for her by her husband's will or to renounce.
By inserting the known values into the formula, T is found to

79. Developed by Paul M. Murphy of The University of Chicago Law
School. The derivation is as follows:
M = (E-D-T)fs (where M = The Marital Deduction)
T = (E-D-M f-Xi,)RF-SF+Eb([(E-D-T)fb-XI]RI-SI)

T= [E-D- (E-D-T)f,-XF ]R-
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be $192,438.80 This is the total of all federal and state death
taxes. To determine the renunciation share, the value of T is
80. $192,438.00 is determined as follows:
First, calculate the amount of the first expression in brackets found
in the numerator of the formula. That expression is: [ (D - E) f +
E - D - XF]. Substitute the known values into the expression:
[(100,000 - 1,000,000) % + 1,000,000 - 100,000 - 60,000J. The expression equals $540,000.
Next, estimate the federal and state tax rates. To estimate these tax
rates, first compute a trial federal tax using only the known values of
the taxable estate by referring to Table K (Table K is found in the Supplemental Instructions for Form 706 supplied by the Internal Revenue
ervice). Compute this tax as follows: First look to Table K opposite
$540,000. The tax rate is 0.310 and the federal substractive term is 21,700.
Next, substitute those values into the first portion of the numerator of the
formula as follows:
T = [(D -E)fa + ED - XF] R - Sr
T = (540,000) (.310)
21,700
T = 145,700
Then, substitute this amount (145,700) into the expression for the
taxable estate:
TE = 540,000 + (0.5) (T)
TE = 540,000 + (0.5) (145,700)
TE = 612,850
The expression (0.5) (T) refers to the one-half marital deduction of the
new amount of 145,700.
This value of 612,850 is an approximation of the taxable estate and
aids in estimating which tax rate to use. In this instance, 612,850 is
within the bracket in Table K for which the tax rate is 0.310 and for
which the federal subtractive term is 21,700.
The estimated tax rate and federal subtractive term can then be inserted into the formula to arrive at the combination of all federal and
state death taxes, or T.
[(D-E)f,+E-D-X, ] R, -SF+Zb([(E-D)fb
- XI]R I - S)

[1 T =

T--

(Rrf s )

+Z b (fbRi

(540,000).310-21,700 +2b([(1,000,000167,400 -

100,000)%-20,000].06-4000)

[I - (.310.
)] + lb('.0.06 )
21,700 + lb((300,000-20,000).06
1 - 0.103 + Yb0 .02

-

4000)

145,700 + Zb 12,800
.897 + Yb0.02
145,700 + (12,800)3
T -.897 + (0.02)3
184,100
T=
0.95667
T = 192,438.00
In the above expression, the values 0.06 and 4000 are the estimated
state tax rates and state subtractive terms respectively. These estimated
rates are found by referring to the appropriate state death tax or state
inheritance tax table. For Illinois, that table in pertinent part is:
Value of Share in
Excess of Exemption
Subtractive
Up To
Rate
Share
50,000
2%
0
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inserted in the statutory formula used to arrive at the renunciation share. In Illinois, that formula is:
Marital deduction = f,(E-D-T)
= 1/3(1,000,000 - 100,000 - 192,438)
=

235,854

renunciation share.

-

The surviving spouse can then easily determine whether it is in
her best interests to renounce and take $235,854, or to take that
given her pursuant to her husband's will.
CONCLUSION

The fact that an increasing number of states have exempted
the renunciation share from satisfying federal estate tax liability
may prompt other states to do likewise. The frustration of the
thrust of the marital deduction -provisions"' of the Revenue Act
of 1948, the contravention of the protective purpose of forced
share statutes,8 2 and the patent unfairness of subjecting a taxexempt deduction to subsequent taxation3 support such a
resolution of the marital deduction dilemma.
There are three options available giving state courts and
legislatures the opportunity for such change. One such alternative is simply the adoption of new legislation. A forced share
statute could be enacted to provide expressly that the renuncia150,000
250,000

4%
6%

500,000
00

10%
14%

Proof of $192,438.00:
Federal Taxes:
Gross Estate
Less
Debts

1,000
4,000

..

14,000
34,000

1,000,000
.

-. -------------..
...
-

Marital deduction

Statutory Exemption ......

--------

-

100,000

235,854

....................- 60,000

395,854
604,146

Taxable Estate
Taxable Estate x Federal Tax Rate

..........................

.310
187,285

Less Federal Subtractive Term
Equals Federal Estate Tax
State Taxes:
Wife:
Son:
Daughter:

(21,700)
-... ...---------------------165,585
((Inherited Share - state exemption) x state tax rate
- state subtractive term = state taxes)
(235,854 - 20,000).06 - 4000 ........- 8,951
(235,854 - 20,000).06 - 4000
--8,951
(235,854 - 20,000).06 - 4000 .
8,951

Federal Taxes + State Taxes
165,585 + 26,853 = 192,438.00

=
=

T
T.

81. See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
82. Id.
83. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.

26,853
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tion share is to be calculated with reference to the gross estate
prior to any reduction by the federal estate tax;34 or a statutory
apportionment scheme could be adopted to provide that all federal and state death, inheritance or. succession taxes be apportioned among interests other than the renunciation share.8 5 Such
legislative approaches are the most desirable solutions. In the
face of such authority, there can be virtually no confusion or
contrary construction.
The second option available to exempt the renunciation share
from estate taxation is the adoption of an equitable apportionment scheme. A state court could ascertain congressional intent
behind the enactment of section 2056 of the Internal Revenue
Code, take notice of the purpose of forced share statutes generally in protecting the surviving spouse, and recognize the unfairness of subjecting to estate taxation a deduction that does not
contribute or add to estate tax liability. The court could then
equitably apportion all estate taxes on interests contributing to
the taxable estate. The weakness of this solution is simply that
the scheme may be overruled or altered in subsequent cases.
The third alternative is to reinterpret existing statutory
authority in accordance with the notion that the renunciation
share should be exempt from estate tax liability. This approach
can be used in those jurisdictions whose existing statutory provisions are amenable to the conclusion that the renunciation
share may be calculated before reducing the gross estate by
claims and expenses.8 6 This alternative cannot be adopted by
those jurisdictions with forced share statutes that provide expressly for the calculation of the renunciation share after the
gross estate has been reduced by claims and expenses. As such,
this option is the least desirable of the three available.
By adopting one of the three approaches, the marital deduction dilemma can be resolved pursuant to the congressional
intent of section 2056. Although the calculation of that interest
subject to estate taxes is simplified by an algebraic formula, the
concern over the propriety of so burdening the renunciation
share continues. Until those states that require the renunciation
share to be reduced by estate taxes adopt the opposite approach,
surviving spouses in those states will continue to receive less than
they should, and the concept of uniform estate taxation will
remain merely a concept rather than a reality.
Neil R. Covert
84. See, e.g., ANN. CODE OF MD., Estates & Trusts, §§ 3-203, 3-102(b),
(f), 11-109 (1974) and WIs. STAT. ANN. § 861.05 (1971).
85. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §63-150 (1971).
86. Illinois is one such jurisdiction. See also text accompanying

notes 52-59 supra.

